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A PRESCRIPTION FOR THE FUTURE:
REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS IN THE
WAKE OF FTC v. ACTAVIS PHARMACEUTICALS
AUDRA J. PASSINAULT*
INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry is a large and important part of the
overall health care system in the United States.  Drug innovation and
improvement lead to safer and more effective pharmaceuticals able to
treat a variety of diseases and ailments.  But the quest by pharmaceuti-
cal companies to develop the next successful drug is an expensive ven-
ture: pharmaceutical companies spend more on research and
development, relative to sales revenue, than almost any other industry
in the United States.1  However, this innovation and investment is
rewarded when the drug is granted a patent by the United States gov-
ernment, giving the developing company a legal monopoly over the
production—and profit—of that drug.2  Yet these patents held by
brand-name pharmaceutical companies are not impervious to chal-
lenge.  Often generic drug manufacturers do challenge patents held by
brand-name companies, hoping to be let in on the market of a profita-
ble new pharmaceutical.  One strategy brand pharmaceutical compa-
nies have traditionally employed to deal with a drug patent challenge is
to settle this threatened patent litigation by paying generic manufactur-
ers large sums of money to drop patent lawsuits with the effect of delay-
ing the generic drugs from entering the market.  These arrangements
between the brand and generic pharmaceutical companies are known
as “pay-for-delay settlements” or “reverse payments” and have been
largely successful in delaying the entry of the lower-priced generic prod-
ucts to the market.3
These reverse-payment settlements have rightly caused regulatory
agencies and consumers to question the legality of the arrangements, as
they cost private consumers—and the government—billions of dollars
* University of Notre Dame Law School, J.D. Candidate 2015.  I would like to
thank my parents, Lisa and Will, and brother, Collin, for their continual love and support.
1. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 9–10 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (estimating the cost of developing a new drug
at $800 million).
2. Murat C. Mungan, Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2013).
3. Jonathan Stempel, Supreme Court to Hear “Pay-for-Delay” Drug Case, REUTERS (Dec.
7, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/07/us-usa-court-drugs-payfordelay-id
USBRE8B617T20121207.
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every year.4  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) began a cam-
paign against these pharmaceutical settlements,5 believing that the
practice of brand-name companies paying off the generic drug compa-
nies amounted to behavior violating antitrust laws.6  The FTC led the
charge against the reverse-payment settlements, and litigation started to
be heard in courts across the nation.7  Yet, due to the complicated
nature of the law and conflicting public policy goals involved in these
cases, a circuit split developed between the courts, with the Eleventh
Circuit confirming the validity of the payment settlements, and the
Third Circuit declaring the payments presumptively anticompetitive
and unlawful.8  Each court laid out in its respective opinion the juris-
prudence and logic behind its decision, and the pharmaceutical world
waited for the Supreme Court to resolve the dispute.
Eventually, in 2012, the Supreme Court heard the case FTC v. Wat-
son Pharmaceuticals9 and resolved the circuit split.  In the 5–3 decision10
the Court refused to adopt the idea that the settlements are facially
anticompetitive but did not specifically endorse the arguments put for-
ward by either the Eleventh Circuit or the Third Circuit.  Instead, the
Supreme Court chose an open, case-by-case approach and stated that
the lower courts must analyze the potential anticompetitive effects of
each settlement put before them.11  This decision by the Supreme
Court has wide-ranging impact on not only the pharmaceutical industry
but also antitrust law, patent law, and health care policy goals in
general.
4. Id. (“According to the FTC, 127 reverse-payment arrangements were struck
between 2005 and 2011, at an annual cost to consumers of $3.5 billion.  [I]n November
2011, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said a U.S. Senate bill to ban reverse
payments would save the government $4.79 billion and lower U.S. spending on prescrip-
tion drugs by $11 billion over a decade.”).
5. The FTC often pursues actions against the pharmaceutical companies together
with the state attorney general.  Marlee P. Kutcher, Comment, Waiting is the Hardest Part:
Why the Supreme Court Should Adopt the Third Circuit’s Analysis of Pay-for-Delay Settlement Agree-
ments, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1093 (2013).
6. Id.
7. Id.  Notably, landmark cases in the Third and Eleventh Circuits such as Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) and In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686
F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
8. Kutcher, supra note 5.
9. Watson Pharmaceuticals was bought out and is now Actavis Pharmaceuticals.
10. Justice Samuel Alito did not take part in the decision, “presumably because of
his earlier involvement with the issue when he was a judge of the Third Circuit Court.”
Lyle Denniston, Opinion Recap: “Pay to delay” in Deep Trouble, SCOTUSBLOG (June 17,
2013, 4:21 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-recap-pay-to-delay-in-
deep-trouble/.
11. Mark Botti & Jessica Hoke, Redefining the Border Between Intellectual Property and
Antitrust: Implications of FTC v. Actavis, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 19, 2013), http://
about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/redefining-the-border-between-
intellectual-property-and-antitrust/ (“In addressing the intersection between patent law
and antitrust, the Court found that the ‘exclusionary potential of the patent’ could not
‘immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.’  Rather, courts must consider both pat-
ent law and antitrust policies to determine the scope of the protection afforded by the
patent.”).
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This Note will proceed to discuss this issue in five parts: Part I will
discuss the background of the legal issues presented by reverse-payment
settlements and the history of the pharmaceutical system; Part II will
briefly explain the history of the Third and Eleventh Circuit reverse-
payment jurisprudence and highlight the origin of the circuit split; Part
III will discuss the circuit split journey to the Supreme Court and the
Court’s eventual holding; Part IV will examine how the Supreme
Court’s holding affects the prescription drug landscape going forward,
including the ethical and policy ramifications of continuing to allow
reverse-payment settlements; and Part V will summarize and conclude
the Note.
I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG INDUSTRY AND THE BIRTH
OF REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
The true question of whether the reverse-payment arrangements
are desirable, or legal, rests on determining if these payments by the
brand company to the generic company are anticompetitive even
though the brand company holds the patent.12  But in order for anyone
to answer this question thoughtfully and completely, it is imperative to
first understand the general background of the pharmaceutical drug
landscape, how reverse-payment settlements came into use, and how
the pharmaceutical patent system currently functions.
The requirements that a pharmaceutical company must meet
before being allowed to distribute a new drug to the public are codified
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.13  According to this Act, a
pharmaceutical company must first receive approval of its Abbreviated
New Drug Application (“ANDA”) from the United States Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”), which requires that the application and
drug meet a series of specific requirements.14  Securing the approval of
this application from the FDA is neither a simple nor inexpensive pro-
cess: the average new drug development takes 10 to 15 years and costs
between $800 million and $1 billion.15  Perhaps the most costly and
12. Kutcher, supra note 5; see generally In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d
Cir. 2012) (analyzing the intersection of antitrust and patent law to resolve the reverse-
payment problem).
13. Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
14. § 355(b).  The requirements for approval are as follows:
(A) reports of investigations . . . show[ing] whether or not such drug is safe for
. . . [and] effective in use; (B) a full list of . . . components; (C) a full statement
of the composition of such drug; (D) a full description of the methods used in,
and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and pack-
ing of such drug; (E) such samples of such drug and of the articles used as
components . . . ; (F) specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such
drug”.
See also Hearing Procedure for Refusal or Withdrawal of Approval of New Drug Applica-
tions and for Issuance, Amendment, or Repeal of Antibiotic Drug Regulations 34 Fed.
Reg. 14,596, 14,596–98 (Sept. 19, 1969).
15. FRONTIERS IN BIOCHIP TECHNOLOGY 192 (Wan-Li Xing & Jing Cheng eds., 2006).
For every 5,000–10,000 compounds that enter the research and development pipeline,
only one will receive approval.  Additionally, it can take up to fifteen years to develop one
new medicine from the earliest stages of discovery to the time it is available for treating
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time-consuming parts of the application approval process for the brand-
name pharmaceutical company to complete are the drug-safety and
effectiveness studies performed in human clinical trials.  The cost of a
single human clinical trial is estimated at $100 million and takes an
average of five years.16
Prior to 1984, this approval process was not any less stringent for
generic drug companies looking to manufacture a less-expensive ver-
sion of the brand-name pharmaceutical.  Generic drug companies were
also required by the FDA to complete the expensive safety and effective-
ness studies on the drug that the brand pharmaceutical companies had
already done before the brand had secured the original FDA
approval.17  This duplicative process required of the generic drug com-
panies was further complicated by the fact that even beginning these
tests on a drug currently covered by a brand patent constituted
infringement.  Therefore, to avoid patent infringement, the generic
drug companies were required to wait until the original patent term
held by the brand pharmaceutical company expired before even begin-
ning their own tests.18  This delay imposed by the lengthy, duplicative
process had the effect of creating “the practical extension of the
monopoly position of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the
patent” by creating “a lapse of several years between expiration of the
patent term and availability of a generic version to consumers.”19
Generic drug companies, government agencies, and consumers all
viewed this imposed delay as unfair and sought a way to change the
system.
After significant lobbying effort by the generic drug companies to
change what they saw as an inherently unfair process, Congress enacted
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
otherwise known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.20  In this Act, Congress rec-
ognized that “[t]he FDA rules on generic drug approval for drugs . . .
have had serious anti-competitive effects.”21  The creation of the Hatch-
patients.  Id. at 192.  The cost grows to between $1 billion and $4 billion dollars when
adjusted for these current failure rates. See Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of
Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/.
16. Herper, supra note 15; see also Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to
Market: The Drug Approval Process, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 362 (2001), available at http:/
/www.medscape.com/viewarticle/405869_4 (describing how, on average, each drug must
successfully complete at least three clinical trials).
17. Kutcher, supra note 5.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1098–99 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 14 (1984) (providing the legis-
lative intent of the Hatch–Waxman Act)).
20. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.  The Act receives its name, the
Hatch–Waxman Act, from its sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry
Waxman.
21. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857.  In addition to Congress being urged to act in recogniz-
ing and combating the anticompetitive effects, there were two other justifications put
forward: “(2) The requirements of duplicative tests on humans unnecessarily endangered
human health; and (3) the approval process diluted the resources of the FDA.”  John C.
O’Quinn, Protecting Private Intellectual Property from Government Intrusion: Revisiting
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Waxman Act, Congress hoped, would create “incentive[s] for increased
[research] expenditures” and therefore decrease drug prices by
allowing for greater generic drug entry into the pharmaceutical mar-
ket.22  The Act sought to make this goal a reality by amending the
requirements for generic drug companies to place their products on
the market, including the removal of the provision that the generic
manufacturers must duplicate the brand drug’s clinical data studies on
safety and effectiveness.  Instead, generic drug manufacturers “may rely
on the FDA’s prior findings on safety and efficacy if it can show that the
generic drug is ‘bioequivalent’ to the patented drug.”23  These amend-
ments to the historical drug development process threatened to erode
the profits of the brand-name pharmaceutical companies by giving
generic drug manufacturers greater and easier access to the prescrip-
tion drug market—the brand-name drug companies could no longer
rely on the law to protect their market share.
The brand-name pharmaceutical companies began to look to the
new regulations of the Hatch-Waxman Act to find a way to protect their
profits.  In this Act, the companies were able to find an opening to start
using reverse-payment settlements.  The specific language found in the
Hatch-Waxman Act that gives rise to the opportunity for reverse-pay-
ment settlements is the requirement that the generic drug companies
still file an ANDA with the FDA announcing their intent to manufac-
ture a generic version of an existing brand-name drug.  In this ANDA,
the generic company must certify to the FDA that the new generic ver-
sion of the drug will not infringe on the existing patent of the brand
drug, or, if the generic drug will infringe on the brand patent, that the
relevant parts of the brand patent are invalid.24  The first generic firm
to file a successful ANDA is “entitled, upon FDA approval, to a 180-day
exclusive right to market a generic version in competition with the
brand-name firm, effectively creating a duopoly during that period.”25
Thus, there exists a great incentive for generic pharmaceutical compa-
nies to quickly file a challenge to the patent of the brand-name drug.
After filing this generic ANDA with the FDA, the generic drug company
has 20 days to notify the existing brand patent holder of their intent
and support their claims of non-infringement or invalidity; the brand-
name drug patent holder then in turn can challenge these declarations
SmithKline and the Case for Just Compensation, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 435, 457 (2002).  Before its
passage, only thirty-five percent of the best-selling drugs had generic equivalents. See
Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1103.
22. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 15; see also Kutcher, supra note 5.
23. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1100 (citation omitted).  The generic drug manufac-
turer must prove that: (1) the active ingredient of the patented drug and generic drug
are the same; (2) the generic drug has the same “route of administration,” dosage form,
and strength as the pioneer drug; and (3) the pioneer drug and generic drug have the
same labeling. Id. at 1100–01. See also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1)–(2)(A)(iv) (2006); Guidance
for Industry Bioequivalence Recommendations for Specific Products, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.
(2010) (providing a list of procedures and guidelines used to determine bioequivalency).
24. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1101 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)).
25. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 634 (2009).
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made by the generic drug company by suing them and having a court
step in to resolve the infringement dispute.26
Patent infringement litigation—like all litigation—is expensive,
time-consuming, and uncertain in its outcome.27  These factors provide
strong motivation for the brand-name drug companies that hold the
patents to search for alternative ways to resolve the dispute with the
generic drug companies interested in entering the market.  Due to the
high cost of litigation on both sides, it is often the case that the generic
drug manufacturer stands to receive more money through settlement
than through successful litigation; the Hatch-Waxman Act, perhaps
inadvertently, “offers great incentives for generics to file first, but not
necessarily to aggressively pursue patent litigation.”28  The reverse-pay-
ment settlement is one such example.  After the generic company files
their ANDA and notifies the brand-name manufacturer, the generic
drug company is paid by the brand-name drug company to forego the
patent challenge and to delay the drug’s entry into the market until the
brand patent naturally (or almost) expires, thereby allowing the brand-
name drug manufacturer to maintain its monopoly over production
and profit.29  These arrangements, unsurprisingly, have raised concern
among many citizens and industry regulators as to the legality of the
26. The brand-name drug company that holds the patent for the drug has 45 days
to file this patent infringement suit.  If the brand-name drug company that holds the
patent chooses not to sue during this time frame, the FDA may approve the ANDA on an
accelerated time schedule.  Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1101–02; see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
27. Kutcher, supra note 5; see also IP Litigation Costs, WIPO MAGAZINE (Feb. 2010),
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2010/
wipo_pub_121_2010_01.pdf  (finding that the average cost through the end of suit for
patent litigation was between $3 to $10 million); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settle-
ment of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV.
747, 757 (2002) (noting there are both direct and indirect costs of patent litigation).
28. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1102 (quoting Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Pat-
ent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39 (2009) (Car-
rier’s view is that because both the brand-name pharmaceutical company and generic
drug company have the same interest to settle (thereby delaying the generic drug’s
entrance into the market), these types of settlement arrangements make the antitrust
harm more severe)).  Not only does a brand-name pharmaceutical have billions to lose
from generic competition, “generic entry hurts the brand-name firm more than it helps
the generic firm.  [Generic] entry lowers total producer profits by introducing price com-
petition, particularly once other generic firms are free to enter after the 180-day period
ends.”  Hemphill, supra note 25, at 637 (noting that settling parties also offer a fundamen-
tal defense “permitting settlement increases the brand-name firm’s profit, and hence its
expected reward for developing innovative drugs, the marketing of which provides great
benefits to consumers.”).
29. A 2002 study conducted by the FTC found that “[d]uring the time period of the
study, there were twenty final settlements of ANDA-related (Abbreviated New Drug Appli-
cation) patent litigation.  Fourteen of the twenty, at the time they were executed, had the
potential to delay the start of the first generic applicant’s 180-day exclusivity.” FED. TRADE
COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, at vii (2002) (emphasis
added).  Further, the study found that “the range of brand (to generic) payments was
$1.75 million to $132.5 million.” Id. at 31.  Because a generic drug company already filed
an ANDA, no other generic drug companies could challenge the brand drug during the
180-day period; therefore, “buying off the first filer is an effective means to remove the
most potent entry threat.”  Hemphill, supra note 25, at 635.
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payments with many claiming they violate antitrust and patent laws.30
In response to this concern of illegality and anti-competitiveness, circuit
courts began to hear cases brought before them challenging reverse-
payment settlements.  However, circuit courts ended up issuing conflict-
ing holdings.
II. EARLY REVERSE SETTLEMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Antitrust law, or competition law, is a unique set of regulations that
promotes and maintains market competition by regulating anticompeti-
tive conduct by companies.  This theory of law and economics was born
in the United States in 1890 when Congress passed the first antitrust
law, the Sherman Antitrust Act.31  The Sherman Act was passed as a
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”32  As such, antitrust
law “maintains certain basic rules of competition as a way to preserve
low prices, efficient production, and robust innovation.”33  To interpret
the appropriate application of antitrust laws, courts often employ the
“rule of reason” analysis, holding that only actions and contracts that
are found to unreasonably restrain trade are subject to court action and
intervention.34  Under this rule of reason analysis, courts believe it is
very important to consider the circumstances under which the allegedly
anticompetitive action is performed.35
However, there are some actions taken by companies that courts
recognize as per se illegal, regardless of circumstances, because “they
result in ‘predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effects’ on compe-
tition and ‘lack any redeeming virtue.’”36  In the past, courts have
found activities per se illegal when the activity in question “facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
30. Congress attempted to curb the provisions of the Act from being abused by
amending the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003, with limited success. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B).  C. Scott Hemphill condemned the process, stating that without doubt
“the consumer-disregarding effect of pay-for-delay settlements requires their condemna-
tion as a violation of antitrust law. . . . [It] is a restraint on trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, and may also be condemned as illegal monopolization.”  Hemphill,
supra note 25, at 636 (citation omitted).
31. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/compe
tition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
32. Id.  Congress followed up the creation of the Sherman Act by passing the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, creating the FTC, and the Clayton Act, both in 1914.
33. Hemphill, supra note 25, at 630 (quoting MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 1 (2006)).
34. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (developing the rule of
reason analysis).
35. Id.  Some characteristics and circumstances that are often considered are “spe-
cific characteristics of the relevant business, the impact of the restraint on the condition
of the business, and the history, nature, and effect of the restraint. . . .”  Kutcher, supra
note 5, at 1105.
36. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1105 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10
(1997) and United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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competition or decrease output.”37  And once a court determines an
activity is per se illegal, no surrounding circumstances are considered.38
But antitrust law is not the only set of regulations that courts must
consider when making decisions concerning reverse-payback settle-
ments in the pharmaceutical industry—patent law issues must also be
analyzed, as pharmaceutical development falls into the realm of intel-
lectual property.  The intellectual property system, at first glance, seems
to be in tension with antitrust law which “fosters innovation through
competition,” whereas patent law and intellectual property “promote[ ]
innovation through ‘government-sanctioned monopolies.’”39  The Pat-
ent Act itself states that “every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . .
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
throughout the United States,”40 which seems to run contrary to the
goals promoted by antitrust law.
The spheres of antitrust law and patent law coexist harmoniously
in that there is a stipulation in patent law stating that “a valid patent
does not give the patent holder any exemption from the Sherman Act’s
provisions, which ‘imposes strict limitations on the concerted activities
in which patent owners may lawfully engage.’”41  Whether pharmaceu-
tical companies engaging in reverse-payment settlement arrangements
violate this stipulation of patent law, making the action a potential viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, is the question courts were tasked with
answering.
The landmark case first holding that reverse-payment settlements
do not violate antitrust laws or illegally restrain trade42 was heard in
2004 in the Second Circuit: In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation.43
37. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979); see, e.g., Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (identifying horizontal
price fixing as preventing competition); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958) (identifying output limitations, market allocation, and group boycotts as evi-
dence of competition restrictions).
38. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1105–06 (“Classic examples of behavior subject to the
per se rule include price fixing, group boycotts, and horizontal restraints of trade restrict-
ing prices or territories.”).
39. Id. at 1107 (quoting Joel Graham, The Legality of Hatch-Waxman Pharmaceutical
Settlements: Is the Terazosin Test the Proper Prescription?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 429, 441
(2006)).  “The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to enact patent legislation to
advance scientific progress.” Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
41. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1107 (quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374
U.S. 174, 197 (1963)).
42. Prior to this holding, courts had been applying strict antitrust scrutiny to the
agreements, finding them illegal. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 915
(6th Cir. 2003) (determining that the agreement was a horizontal market allocation
device, and thus illegal per se); Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799,
819 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying antitrust scrutiny to find that the agreement constituted
prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade).
43. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).  There had been cases previously that were scat-
tered in their holdings and logic. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that the court must consider the exclusionary
scope of the patent to determine whether an antitrust violation occurred); In re Cardizem,
332 F.3d at 915 (determining that the agreement was a horizontal market allocation
device, and thus per se illegal); Andrx Pharms., 256 F.3d at 819 (applying antitrust scrutiny
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The resulting holding of the Second Circuit originated the “scope of
the patent” test, which states that reverse-payment settlements are not
facially anticompetitive as long as they do not restrict the generic drug’s
eventual introduction to the market after a brand-name manufacturer’s
patent rights expire.44  Following the unfavorable Tamoxifen ruling, the
FTC petitioned for certiorari from the Supreme Court, but was ulti-
mately unsuccessful.  This jurisprudence developed by the Second Cir-
cuit in Tamoxifen was later affirmed in proceeding cases, and eventually
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit as well.45
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s “scope of the
patent test” when deciding Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC46 in 2005.  The
FTC challenged settlements that “Schering-Plough reached with two
generic manufacturers that filed applications to make versions of the
drug K-Dur, a potassium chloride supplement used to treat side effects
from blood pressure medication.”47  And so, in agreement with the Sec-
ond Circuit’s Tamoxifen holding, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
reverse-payment settlements were permissible “because they didn’t
exceed the scope of Schering’s patent.”48  This case did not die with the
Eleventh Circuit’s holding, however.  Additional antitrust litigation suits
were filed by several pharmacies and a class of consumers on the basis
that, because the generics were even somewhat delayed in their
entrance to the market, they as retailers and consumers were being
forced to pay higher brand-name prices.  Although the case was origi-
nally tossed out of court, the parties made a subsequent successful
appeal to the Third Circuit.49  The Third Circuit heard the Schering-
Plough settlement litigation in the case of In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litigation.50
The holding51 of In re K-Dur in the Third Circuit was unexpected
by the pharmaceutical drug community and had far reaching implica-
tions for the future of reverse-payment litigation.  The Third Circuit
reviewed the same settlement arrangement that the Eleventh Circuit
had considered in Schering-Plough but reached the opposite conclu-
sion.52  The Third Circuit court held that:
to find that the agreement constituted prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint
of trade).
44. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213; see also Alison Frankel, 3rd Circuit Shocker: Pay-for-
Delay Drug Settlements are Illegal, REUTERS (July 17, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://blogs.reuters
.com/alison-frankel/2012/07/17/3rd-circuit-shocker-pay-for-delay-drug-settlements-are-
illegal/.
45. See Frankel, supra note 44.
46. 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
47. Frankel, supra note 44 (“The FTC claimed the settlements were an illegal
restraint of trade that improperly preserved Schering’s monopoly on the drug.”).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 686 F.3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2012).
51. Written by Third Circuit Judge Dolores Sloviter for a panel that also included
Judge Thomas Vanaskie and District Court Judge Lawrence Stengel, sitting by
designation.
52. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1123–27.
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After consideration of the arguments of counsel, the conflicting
decisions in the other circuits . . . and our own reading, we cannot
agree with those courts that apply the scope of the patent test.  In
our view, that test improperly restricts the application of antitrust
law and is contrary to the policies underlying the Hatch-Waxman
Act and a long line of Supreme Court precedent on patent litiga-
tion and competition.53
The Third Circuit held that the reverse-payment settlements
should be subject to a higher level of scrutiny under antitrust laws, sid-
ing with the FTC.54  The reasoning behind this opinion was that
reverse-payment deals permit even weak brand-name patents to confer
monopoly rights, as any generic drug with a legitimate challenge would
simply be paid off to drop the challenge, which is contrary to public
policy.55  Instead of placing a high level of emphasis on the potential
costs to pharmaceutical companies if these settlements were outlawed,
the Third Circuit focused more heavily on the cost of reverse-payment
settlements to consumers.56
In its holding, the Third Circuit went a step beyond merely invali-
dating the “scope of the patent” test57 used in the Second and Eleventh
Circuits.  The Third Circuit proposed a new antitrust test for district
courts to use when they were confronted with issues of reverse-payment
settlements and broke this new test down into three considerations for
lower courts to follow:
1. The court need not review the merits of the underlying patent
infringement suit,58
53. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.  This holding was perhaps bolstered by the Obama
Administration proposing a ban on anticompetitive settlements in the 2009 annual
budget proposal and stating their support of the FTC’s mission, “[t]he Administration
will prevent drug companies from blocking generic drugs from consumers by prohibiting
anticompetitive agreements and collusion between brand-name and generic drug manu-
facturers intended to keep generic drugs off the market.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A
NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 28 (2009), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Re
sponsibility2.pdf.
54. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214–18.
55. See id. at 216–17 (“Reverse payments permit the sharing of monopoly rents
between would-be competitors without any assurance that the underlying patent is
valid. . . . [W]hile such a rule might be good policy from the perspective of name brand
and generic pharmaceutical producers, it is bad policy from the perspective of the con-
sumer, precisely the constituency Congress was seeking to protect.”); Kutcher, supra note
5, at 1125 (“In reality, allowing reverse-payment settlements does not reward patent hold-
ers based on the strength of their patents, but rather, on the ‘strength of [their] wallets.’”
(quoting K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 217)).
56. See Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1121–27 (comparing In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208
(focusing on the cost of reverse payments to the public), with In re Ciprofloxacin Hydro-
chloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasizing the public
policy in favor of settlements)).
57. The Third Circuit saw this scope of the patent test as creating an “almost
unrebuttable presumption of patent validity.” In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 214.
58. The court and the FTC generally agree that an analysis of the validity of the
underlying patent is unnecessary.  The FTC has made clear that an analysis of patent
validity would be inappropriate stating that:
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2. The patent holder may attempt to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie
case of an unreasonable restraint of trade by demonstrating that
there was no reverse payment because the settlement amount was
consideration for something other than a delay in market entry,
and/or
3. The patent holder may argue that the reverse-payment offers a
competitive benefit that could not have been achieved without a
reverse payment.59
As shown in the Third Circuit’s breakout of how cases should be
decided going forward, this circuit’s judiciary believed that courts
should begin with the principle that reverse-payment settlements are an
unreasonable restraint on trade and then shift the burden of proof
onto the pharmaceutical companies, forcing the brand-name drug
manufacturer to prove that the settlement, which delays the generic
drug’s entrance into the market, serves a secondary or competitive pur-
pose.60  The court decided against applying the “scope of the patent”
test developed and applied in other circuits, “holding that it both fails
to subject reverse payment settlements to antitrust scrutiny and ignores
the policies underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act.”61  Having reviewed
the same Eleventh Circuit Schering-Plough settlement, the Third Circuit’s
holding in In re K-Dur directly contradicted the previous holding by the
Eleventh Circuit, creating a circuit split that many saw as ripe for
Supreme Court review.62
[a]n after-the-fact inquiry by the Commission into the merits of the underlying
litigation is not only unlikely to be particularly helpful, but also likely to be unre-
liable.  As a general matter, tribunals decide patent issues in the context of a
true adversary proceeding, and their opinions are informed by the arguments of
opposing counsel.  Once a case settles, however, the interests of the formerly
contending parties are aligned.  A generic competitor that has agreed to delay
its entry no longer has an incentive to attack vigorously the validity of the patent
in issue or a claim of infringement.
In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 997 (2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.
2005); see also Kutcher, supra note 5.
59. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1126–27.
60. Id. at 1138.
61. Id. at 1124
The court explained that the scope of the patent test created an ‘almost
unrebuttable presumption of patent validity,’ which presupposed the issue in
the patent suit.  The Third Circuit observed that when a court presumes that
patent validity extends to the patent holder’s ability to exclude competitors from
the market, it forgets that the presumption of patent validity is a procedural
device, rather than a substantive conclusion.  ‘The presumption, like all legal
presumptions, is a procedural device, not substantive law.’
Id. (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroqip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  Per-
haps most tellingly, the court cited an FTC study showing that generic challengers pre-
vailed seventy-three percent of the time in Hatch–Waxman challenges. See Kutcher, supra
note 5; In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY
PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, at 16 (2002)); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases - An Empirical Peek inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000) (reporting
that alleged infringers prevailed in forty-two percent of patent cases that reached trial
from 1983 to 1999).
62. Including FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz, who expressed the need for Supreme
Court review in his address at the Sixth Annual Georgetown Law Global Antitrust
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III. REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT
The reverse-payment settlement case that was eventually heard and
resolved in the Supreme Court, FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals,63
originated in the Eleventh Circuit.  Respondent, Solvay Pharmaceuti-
cals, had received a patent in 2003 for its approved brand-name drug,
AndroGel, used for treating low testosterone levels in men.64  Later that
same year, two generic drug companies, Watson Pharmaceuticals (now
Actavis) and Paddock, filed patents for generic drugs closely modeled
after AndroGel.65  To block this generic drug from coming to the mar-
ket, greatly decreasing the potential profits of Solvay, Solvay filed a pat-
ent infringement suit against Actavis and Paddock.  After three years of
preliminary patent litigation, the FDA cleared the way for Actavis’
generic version of AndroGel to enter the market.66
Despite having obtained FDA approval to continue with the devel-
opment, creation, and distribution of its generic drug, Actavis decided
to enter into a reverse-payment settlement with Solvay Pharmaceuticals
in 2006.67  Under the terms of this settlement agreement, Actavis was
“granted a license to launch their generic AndroGel products starting
in August 2015—five years before the [Solvay] patent was set to
expire.”68  In return for Actavis agreeing to delay their entry into the
pharmaceutical market, “Solvay agreed to pay . . . $10 million per year
for six years . . . [and] share a portion of its AndroGel profits with
[Actavis].”69
As required by law, these payments and settlement provisions were
reported to the FTC, which is how the regulatory agency became
alerted to the existence of the highly lucrative reverse-payment arrange-
ment between Solvay and Actavis.  After being notified of the settlement
and reviewing the agreed-upon arrangements, the FTC filed an anti-
Enforcement Symposium.  Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Federal Trade Comm’n, Remarks at
the Sixth Annual Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 19,
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2012/09/remarks-ftc-chairman-
jon-leibowitz-prepared-delivery; Edward Wyatt, Justices to Take Up Generic Drug Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/business/
justices-to-take-up-generic-drug-case.html?_r=0 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision
to hear the pay-for-delay case and its importance to the industry and U.S. consumers).
63. 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012), and rev’d and
remanded sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
64. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/manufac-
turer/solvay-pharmaceuticals-inc-132.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).  This patent Solvay
had for AndroGel would last until 2020.  David Tellekson & Melanie L. Mayer, United
States: Supreme Court Rules on “Reverse Payment” Settlements in Federal Trade Commission v.
Actavis, Inc., MONDAQ, (June 18, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/2457
08/trials+appeals+compensation/Supreme+Court+Rules+On+Reverse+Payment+Settle
ments+In+Federal+Trade+Commission+v+Actavis+Inc.
65. Denniston, supra note 10.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Tellekson & Mayer, supra note 64.  Actavis also agreed to promote branded
AndroGel to urologists and work with Par/Paddock to provide back-up manufacturing
capabilities for the branded AndroGel product.
69. Id.  Solvay projected these payments would total between $19 million and $30
million per year.
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trust lawsuit against Solvay and Actavis.70  In the complaint, the FTC
alleged that “the settlement agreements were unlawful agreements not
to compete.”71  Additionally, the FTC claimed that Solvay and Actavis
entered into these agreements in order to “defer generic competition
for the branded AndroGel product by postponing the entry date of the
generic drugs, which maintained Solvay’s monopoly and allowed the
parties to share those monopoly profits at the expense of consumers.”72
Arguments and motions were heard in the Georgia district court begin-
ning in 2004.
Despite the FTC’s stated grounds for a claim, the district court
granted Solvay’s motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the fact that
the court believed the higher Eleventh Circuit precedent “immunized
reverse payment settlement agreements from antitrust attack unless a
settlement imposes an exclusion greater than that contained in the pat-
ent at issue.”73  The FTC, in their complaint filed against Solvay, failed
to allege that the settlement agreement between Solvay and Actavis
exceeded the scope of the AndroGel patent.74  The FTC appealed the
Georgia district court’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit appeals court,
but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal because
the settlement between the companies passed the “scope of the patent”
test.75  This was not the end of the case, as it provided an opportunity
for the issue of reverse-payment settlements to be heard in the Supreme
Court. FTC v. Actavis, Inc. was granted certiorari to be heard by the
Supreme Court for a resolution of the circuit split.
At the conclusion of oral arguments, the Supreme Court handed
down a 5-3 decision reversing the Eleventh Circuit ruling that antitrust
laws would only apply to patent holders if they acted outside the scope
of their patent monopoly.76  The Court majority opinion, written by
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, held that the question if the patent violated
antitrust laws must be decided by measuring the anticompetitive effect
on patent law policy and also by measuring against “procompetitive”
70. Id.
71. Id.  This, the FTC claimed, was in violation of antitrust laws and Section 5(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.
72. Id. (“The FTC’s claim was based on the FTC’s allegation that Solvay would have
lost the underlying patent litigation and the [AndroGel] patent would therefore not have
barred the generic manufacturers from bringing their generic AndroGel products to
market.”).
73. Id. (citing In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga.
2010)).
74. Tellekson, supra note 64 (“Indeed, the settlement agreements provided that the
generic manufacturers could market generic AndroGel five years before the . . . patent
was set to expire.”).
75. Id. (quoting FTC v. Watson Pharms., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012)).  The
settlement passed the test in that the FTC had not alleged that the patent infringement
litigation was sham litigation, that the AndroGel patent was obtained by fraud, or that any
anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreements were outside the scope of the exclu-
sionary potential of the patent.
76. Denniston, supra note 10 (The Supreme Court overturned the result of the
11th Circuit ruling.  The Court “did not rule for the FTC on the legality of this arrange-
ment, but rather returned the case to set up an actual trial at which the FTC will have to
prove its claims of illegality.”).
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antitrust law policies.77  In the view of the Supreme Court majority,
reverse-payment settlements “can sometimes violate the antitrust
laws.”78  In its holding, the Court refused to take the hardline stance
advocated by the FTC (presuming all reverse-payments are unlawful)
and also refused to take the position the dissent and pharmaceutical
company backed (that such agreements are not subject to antitrust
scrutiny unless they involve sham litigation or a patent obtained
through fraud).79  Justice Breyer’s majority opinion “criticized the Elev-
enth Circuit’s (and the dissent’s) promotion of the patent laws’ goal of
encouraging innovation over the competing antitrust laws’ intent to
promote unrestricted competition.”80
The Supreme Court majority, instead of completely siding with
either side of the argument, developed a middle ground approach simi-
lar to the holding of the Third Circuit.  The Court held that when a
reverse-payment settlement agreement is legally challenged, the review-
ing court must evaluate the agreement under a “rule of reason” analy-
sis.81  The rule of reason analysis developed by the Supreme Court
majority, common in antitrust litigation, is a test in which “the com-
plaining party must prove that the anticompetitive effects resulting
from the allegedly wrongful conduct outweigh any pro-competitive ben-
efits associated with the same conduct.”82  This is a new style of antitrust
lawsuit that the Court is promoting in their decision, with Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, making it clear that “the mere fact that
the generic was being held off only during the remaining period of a
patent’s validity was not enough to make such a payoff immune to anti-
trust lawsuit.”83
77. Id.
78. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013).
79. Reverse Payment Settlements in Jeopardy Following Supreme Court Ruling in FTC v.
Actavis, FISH & RICHARDSON (June 19, 2013), http://www.fr.com/FTC-Actavis-Reverse-Pay
ment-Settlement/.
80. Id. See Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1124 (citations omitted) (The Court looked to
previously offered “empirical and legal support for the public interest in judicial testing
and eliminating weak patents.”); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83,
100–01 (1993) (noting both the public policy in resolving questions of patent validity and
the danger of granting monopoly privileges to the holders of invalid patents).  Addition-
ally, “patent laws embody a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and
the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to
invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”  Kutcher, supra note 5,
at 1124 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989)).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that a patent “affords no immunity for a
monopoly not fairly or plainly within the grant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942)).  And finally, the Court agrees with the Third Circuit
finding that “It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed by
worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected
in his monopoly.” Id. (quoting Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
81. FISH & RICHARDSON, supra note 79.
82. Id. The rule of reason analysis is notorious among antitrust practitioners (and
litigants) for its fact-intensive nature and overall complexity, both of which increase litiga-
tion costs.
83. Denniston, supra note 10.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-2\NDE209.txt unknown Seq: 15 20-APR-15 17:01
2015] REVERSE-PAYMENTS AFTER FTC V. ACTAVIS PHARMACEUTICALS 563
With this holding, the majority decided to invalidate the jurispru-
dence laid out by the Eleventh Circuit below because it saw that “the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision ‘throws the baby out with the bath water’ by
sacrificing the pro-competition policies underlying the antitrust laws
because of the difficulties associated with conducting a rule-of-reason
analysis.”84  The majority opinion provided five rationales for this con-
clusion reached in the decision:
(1) reverse-payment settlements risk “significant” anticompetitive
effects;
(2) those anticompetitive effects can be unjustified;
(3) based on the magnitude of some payments, the party making
the payments likely has power to quell competition;
(4) the administrative burden associated with resolving these
cases is less onerous than feared, because “it is normally not neces-
sary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question”;
and
(5) possible antitrust liability for “large, unjustified” reverse pay-
ments does not discourage parties from entering into legitimate
settlements of litigation.85
It can be seen through the application of these five rationales and
the broader holding of the Supreme Court that it saw the Second, Elev-
enth, and Federal Circuits improperly interpreted the presumption of
patent validity.86 FTC v. Actavis, Inc. was reversed and remanded to the
Eleventh Circuit to be reconsidered by the court in light of the new
Supreme Court jurisprudence.87
84. Id. (quoting FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013)).
85. Id.
86. Kutcher, supra note 5; see In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544
F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“In the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or
sham litigation, the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust
analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.”); In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Unless and until the patent is shown to
have been procured by fraud, or a suit of its enforcement is shown to be objectively base-
less, there is no injury to the market cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as
competition is restrained only within the scope of the patent.”); Schering-Plough Corp. v.
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding reverse payments legal because they
did not exceed the patents); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (instructing the district court to consider the scope of the
patent and whether the agreements exceeded the scope).
87. Many scholars in the pharmaceutical development community, including
Kutcher in her article, advocated this eventual outcome reached by the Supreme Court.
She writes: “[T]he Supreme Court should further outline specific factors for lower federal
courts to consider when evaluating the antitrust defendants’ rebuttal” and “[b]ecause
fully analyzing patent validity would be overly burdensome and potentially unreliable,
allowing antitrust defendants to present evidence of the patent’s validity offers a suitable
middle-ground approach.”  Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1145, 1148.  Kutcher was not alone
in this view; see Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Pre-
sumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 76 (2009) (proposing these rebuttal options for
antitrust defendants).  This approach is what the Supreme Court used when developing
its opinion. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE NEW
REVERSE PAYMENT LANDSCAPE
There are many ethical and policy considerations that set the scene
for the Supreme Court decision that, while not completely outlawing
reverse payment settlements, is seen as more favorable to the settlement
challengers.  After all, it is true that reverse-payment settlements merely
transfer “wealth from consumers to drug makers, in the form of contin-
ued high pharmaceutical prices, with brand-name firms sharing a por-
tion of that transfer with the generic firm.”88  Additionally, high
pharmaceutical drug costs force consumers and insurance providers to
“adjust purchasing decisions, which also contributes to consumer wel-
fare loss.”89
These higher pharmaceutical costs are not a harmless facet of the
health care industry, and with the ruling in FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme
Court recognized this fact.  David Balto, a former Federal Trade Com-
mission policy director, described Actavis as “the health care reform
case of 2013” and said that “[t]here’s no other case that can have as
much impact on reducing health care costs.”90  The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that generic drugs save consumers an esti-
mated “$8 to $10 billion a year at retail pharmacies”91 and with greater
availability of generics, savings would be even higher.  According to the
FDA, prescription drug “consumers who are able to replace all their
brand-name drugs with generics can save up to 52% on their daily drug
costs.”92
These potential savings would have a great impact on the lives of
Americans.  Overall, Americans spent $325.8 billion on prescription
88. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1131 (quoting Hemphill, supra note 25, at 636).
89. Hemphill, supra note 25, at 636.  Hemphill goes on to explain that
[i]n an ordinary market, setting a price above marginal cost produces an alloca-
tive distortion and accompanying welfare loss for consumers, because consum-
ers who value the good above its marginal cost, but below the prevailing price,
are deflected to less desired substitutes.  To the extent that public and private
insurance secures the purchase of a drug, this distortion is reduced, though it is
not eliminated (as insurance is incomplete).  Moreover, the higher price pro-
duces new distortions (and hence inefficiency) in the decision-making process
of the insurance provider, through decisions to charge higher premiums and
not to reimburse drugs whose value exceeds their marginal cost.  In a similar
manner, the existence of incomplete insurance affects the assessment of the size
of the transfer.
Id. at 636 n.21; see also Raymond Gibbons, M.D., Jeffrey Korsmo & Roshelle Plutowski,
Payment Changes Necessary to Catalyze Higher-Quality, Lower Care Cost, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 393 (2011).
90. Brett Norman, Supreme Court Takes Up Case on Generic Drugs, POLITICOPRO (Dec.
10, 2012, 4:29 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/supreme-court-generic-
drugs-pay-for-delay-84810.html?hp=r6.
91. Generic Drugs: Same Medicine, Lower Cost, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (Feb. 2013)
at 2, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM340458
.pdf.
92. Timothy P. Colligan, Generic Drugs: A Smart Way to Reduce Healthcare Costs,
OPTIMAHEALTH, http://www.optimahealth.com/wellnesspayoff/siteresources/Generic-
Drugs-Colligan.pdf (last visited March 26, 2014).
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drugs in 201293 and, according to the IMS Institute for Healthcare
Informatics’ director of research, Michael Kleinrock, many Americans
are skipping out on their prescriptions because they are struggling to
afford all of their medical costs and are therefore being forced to ration
their health care.94  But this rationing does not seem to be reflected in
the profits of large pharmaceutical companies: the eleven largest drug
companies’ profits have been climbing over the past eight years, with
those companies earning approximately $85 billion in 2012.95  There is
a disconnect in the pharmaceutical drug industry between manufac-
turer and customer, and many see Actavis as a case that may play a part
in shifting the tide.
Preventing large companies from taking advantage of consumers
through the creation of anticompetitive arrangements is precisely what
antitrust laws were designed to prevent.  The Sherman Act, the
landmark antitrust act, was created with the purpose to “preserve[ ] the
fundamental rules of competition to protect and encourage lower
prices, spark innovation, and maintain efficient industry production.”96
By the Supreme Court acknowledging that reverse-payment settlements
sometimes harm consumers, they have further opened the dialogue on
ethical health care spending and consumer access.
The impact of the Supreme Court decision is enhanced due to the
fact that reverse-payment settlements97 made by brand pharmaceutical
companies to generic pharmaceutical companies are not a rare occur-
rence with minimal impact.98  It is true that the Hatch-Waxman Act has
increased generic drug entry into the market.  Generic drugs now com-
93. Tara Culp-Ressler, Prescription Drug Spending Drops As Struggling Americans Are
Forced To Cut Back On Health Care, THINKPROGRESS (May 10, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://think-
progress.org/health/2013/05/10/1993841/prescription-drug-spending-drops/.
94. Id. (“IMS found affordability of health care remains a big problem for many
Americans, with growing out-of-pocket costs forcing people to go without needed doctor
visits, medicines and other treatments.  One out of every five Americans has asked their
doctor to prescribe a cheaper medication in order to lower their prescription costs . . . .”).
95. Id.
96. Kutcher, supra note 5, at 1104; see also The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.”).
97. See Hemphill, supra note 25, at 632 (“Whereas early settlements simply traded
cash for delay, modern settlements show sophistication in the means by which payment
and delay are provided.  One example is the use of side deals, consummated at the same
time as settlement of the patent litigation, in which the generic firm contributes unre-
lated value, such as a separate patent license, ostensibly in exchange for payment.”).
98. See Kevin D. McDonald et al., United States: Antitrust Alert: New FTC Pharma Patent
Litigation Report Finds Increase in “Reverse Payment” Settlements Based on Expanded Definition of
“Payments,” MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/221012/Antitrust+vCom
petition/Antitrust+Alert+New+FTC+Pharma+Patent+Litigation+Report+Finds+Increase+
In+Reverse+Payment+Settlements+Based+On+Expanded+vDefinition+Of+Payments.
The FTC’s current definition of “payment”—meaning “some form of compensa-
tion” or any “valuable thing”—could include every type of consideration availa-
ble in a patent-litigation settlement, such as allowing an early entry date, a low
royalty to the patent-holder, a beneficial field of use restriction, or a compro-
mise on a damages claim—as well as paying cash or providing an exclusive
license.
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prise 47% of the total number of drugs prescribed, up 19% since the
passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984.99
Despite this increase, prior to the Actavis ruling, the number of
generic drugs available to the consumer was often being artificially sup-
pressed through the employment of reverse-payment settlements: “In
Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the number of potentially anticompetitive patent
dispute settlements between branded and generic drug companies
increased significantly compared with FY 2011, jumping from 28 to
40.”100  FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz weighed in on this, stating,
“[s]adly, this year’s report makes it clear that the problem of pay-for-
delay is getting worse, not better.”101  Chairman Leibowitz went on to
say that “[m]ore and more brand and generic drug companies are
engaging in these sweetheart deals, and consumers continue to pay the
price.  Until this issue is resolved, we will all suffer the consequences of
delayed generic entry—higher prices for consumers, businesses, and
the U.S. taxpayer.”102
The cost savings from brand-name pharmaceuticals to generic
drugs is astounding; generic drugs typically cost 85% less than brand-
name drugs.103  Not only does this increased cost affect the individual,
but it also affects the government and businesses.  The FTC found that
“[b]y delaying the entry of cheaper generics, pay-for-delay deals cost
Americans $3.5 billion annually and will add to the federal deficit.”
This was echoed by a report from the Congressional Budget Office that
estimated “legislation restricting these agreements would reduce the
debt by almost $5 billion over the next decade.”104  High and increas-
ing prescription drug expenditures create “an unsustainable burden on
America’s economy, with far-reaching consequences,” according to a
Commonwealth Fund report.105  This economic burden trickles down
to American businesses providing health insurance plans, making them
“less competitive internationally” and restricting “resources to invest in
99. GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 29.
100. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Study: In FY 2012, Branded
Drug Firms Significantly Increased the Use of Potential Pay-for-Delay Settlements to Keep
Generic Competitors off the Market (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2013/01/ftc-study-fy-2012-branded-drug-firms-significantly-increased.
101. Id.
102. Id. (“Generic drugs are the key to making medicines affordable for millions of
American consumers, and help hold down costs for taxpayer-funded health programs
such as Medicare and Medicaid.”).
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as
a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2006) (explaining the antitrust
implications of reverse-payment settlements); Marcy L. Lobanoff, Comment, Anti-Competi-
tive Agreements Cloaked as “Settlements” Thwart the Purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 50 EMORY
L.J. 1331, 1338 (2001) (“[P]ioneer brand-name drug companies are paying generic drug
companies, which challenge the brand-name drug patents, not to compete or to delay
litigation.”).
105. What is Driving U.S. Health Care Spending? America’s Unsustainable Health Care
Cost Growth, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, at 4 (Sept. 2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/BPC%20Health%20Care%20Cost%20Drivers%20Brief%20Sept%20
2012.pdf; see also Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richmand, Who Pays? Who Benefits?
Unfairness in American Health Care, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2011).
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innovation and new technologies.”106  On an individual level, the
increased cost of employer-provided health insurance, due largely in
part to high prescription drug cost and utilization, “contributes to the
stagnation of middle class wages, because salary increases are replaced
by an employer’s subsidies toward health care benefits.”107  With these
facts and figures as a reality in the United States, it is no wonder Actavis
is quoted as a case with great potential impact.
Yet critics of the holding, including the dissent in the case,108 raise
considerations that should not be ignored.  It is easy to see how many in
the broader intellectual property world would be concerned, for as this
Supreme Court analysis is used in the lower courts, its holding will likely
grow to reach beyond reverse-payment settlements in the pharmaceuti-
cals industry.109  The majority attempted to address this concern by
writing that “most if not all reverse payment settlement agreements
arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation.”110  Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, writing in the dissent, says this containment is “unlikely”
and “fear[s] the Court’s attempt to limit its holding to the context of
patent settlements under Hatch-Waxman will not long hold.”111  This
worries many in the patent law field, and with good reason.  Patent law,
as previous stated, serves an important and worthy purpose in balancing
antitrust laws, and courts should pause before subjecting standard
clauses in patent licensing agreements to greater scrutiny.  As the
majority stressed in the Actavis holding, lower courts should work to
truly determine the desired balance between any potentially anticompe-
titive actions with potential benefits.
The second objection to the holding made in the dissent speaks to
the structure of the justice system and principles of judicial economy.
The dissent wrote that not only would the majority holding fail to be
contained to the pharmaceutical drug industry, it “would [also] do
grave harm to the entire concept that it is a good thing for lawsuits—
especially expensive ones like patent fights—to be settled without tri-
als.”112  Even among reverse-payment settlements, not all such pay-
ments between pharmaceutical companies are improper or made in
bad faith; a pharmaceutical company with a strong drug patent, but
with “knowledge that there is always a chance it may be struck down
106. U.S. Healthcare Costs: Report on Healthcare Spending, MEDICAL MUTUAL, at 2,
https://www.medmutual.com/~/media/Files/Miscellaneous%20MedMutualcom%20
PDFs/U%20S%20%20Healthcare%20Costs%20Report_rvsd%20092413.ashx (last visited
March 26, 2014).
107. Id.
108. Chief Justice Roberts filed dissenting opinion in which Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined.  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238–47 (2013) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
109. Botti & Hoke, supra note 11 (“Both the majority and the dissent relied and
shed new light on older antitrust decisions involving patents, making clear that the Actavis
decision would apply to patent pools, cross-licensing arrangements, and more routine
patent licensing decisions.”).
110. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
111. Id. at 2243.
112. Denniston, supra note 10.
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and . . . that even winning a patent case costs lots of money, may be
willing to make a modest payment to gain several years of peace and
profits.”113
It is important to remember when considering reverse settlement
payments, that the majority opinion did not hold that all such settle-
ments are per se illegal.  The Court merely confirmed that such arrange-
ments are subject to antitrust laws and instructed the lower courts “to
test whether [the settlements] are or are not harmful to competi-
tion.”114  A settlement is deemed harmful to competition, according to
the majority, when the payments are “large and unjustified.”115
Although some criticize this bar to be too amorphous and unde-
fined,116 the uncertainty inherent in judicial balancing tests will
undoubtedly make pharmaceutical companies think twice before
engaging in a bad-faith reverse-payment settlement to protect a weak
patent.  The progress that has come from this opinion is undeniable,
and groups are already using this holding as a springboard for further
prescription drug and ethical health care dialogue.117
V. CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen if the Supreme Court holding in FTC v.
Actavis, Inc. has any effect on decreasing the numbers of reverse-pay-
ment settlements.  Further, it would be even longer until anyone could
estimate the impact the decreased number of reverse-payment settle-
ments would have on the price and utilization of prescription drugs.
But it is undeniable that the pharmaceutical industry is a large player in
the overall health care system in the United States, and that this health
care system can always improve.  With nearly 70% of Americans utiliz-
ing at least one prescription drug,118 it should be no surprise that this
issue was front and center in the judiciary when FTC v. Actavis, Inc.
made its way to the Supreme Court in 2012.
It is important for domestic health care policy to encourage drug
innovation and improvement with an emphasis on the development of
safer and more effective pharmaceuticals with a range of treatment
objectives.  Although it is a reality that the goal of developing a new
113. Alan Morrison, Commentary: Subjecting Reverse Payments in Patent Cases to Anti-
trust Scrutiny: Sounds Like a Good Idea, But Can It Work?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 25, 2013, 10:23
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/commentary-subjecting-reverse-payments-in-
patent-cases-to-antitrust-scrutiny-sounds-like-a-good-idea-but-can-it-work/.
114. Denniston, supra note 10.
115. Morrison, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. Id.  Some are proposing that this holding is somewhat vague and does not have
a concrete path to practice.  One solution would be for Congress to enact a statute that
would create antitrust immunity if the district court approved the settlement as fair and
reasonable, rather like the way that class actions are settled.
118. Mayo Clinic, Nearly 7 in 10 Americans Are on Prescription Drugs, SCIENCEDAILY
(June 19, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/06/130619132352.htm.
Antibiotics, antidepressants and painkilling opioids are most commonly prescribed.
Additionally, twenty percent of patients are on five or more prescription medications.
Drugs were prescribed to both men and women across all age groups. Id.
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successful drug is an expensive venture for pharmaceutical companies,
these investments are rewarded with company profits in the billions of
dollars.  The goal of patent law is to encourage research, development,
and innovation, and when a pharmaceutical company manages to
develop a new drug, no one doubts that this innovation should be
rewarded with a patent.  This patent will help the pharmaceutical com-
pany recuperate the money invested in research, development, testing,
and distribution; it will reward the company for its innovative idea; and
it will provide an incentive for other companies to also develop new
drugs.
But the reward of being granted a patent is not absolute, nor with-
out caveat.  Patents held may be challenged, and those holding the pat-
ents are still bound to respect antitrust laws spelled out in the Sherman
Act.  The question of whether reverse-payment settlements violate anti-
trust laws was decided by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,
healing a circuit split on the issue.  The Court refused to adopt the idea
that the settlements are facially anticompetitive, instead choosing an
open, case-by-case approach, instructing lower courts to analyze the
potential anticompetitive effects of each settlement put before them.
This decision by the Supreme Court is lauded by many for its wide-
ranging impact on not only the pharmaceutical industry, but also anti-
trust law, patent law, and health care policy goals in general.
Even without enough distance between the Supreme Court deci-
sion and today to be able to analyze the shift in prescription drug
reverse-payment settlements, there are still concrete changes that have
begun to manifest in the industry.  As a practical matter,
“[m]anufacturers of pharmaceuticals, both branded and generic, must
carefully consider whether patent disputes can continue to be resolved
by reverse payment settlement agreements, given the likelihood that
such settlements will trigger costly litigation challenging their valid-
ity.”119  The FTC, now with the backing of the Supreme Court’s valida-
tion, has the power to rigorously examine under a regulatory
microscope “[t]he terms of reverse payment settlement agreements,
including settlement payments and collaborative research and develop-
ment agreements”120 among the pharmaceutical parties.
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez summarizes the Supreme Court
opinion best, stating that the decision “is a significant victory for Ameri-
can consumers, American taxpayers, and free markets . . . . With this
finding, the Court has taken a big step toward addressing a problem
that has cost Americans $3.5 billion a year in higher drug prices.”121  As
Chairwoman Ramirez states, this decision by the Supreme Court cannot
be viewed only in the context of antitrust and patent law.  It is impor-
tant to remember that this decision has a great impact on the health
119. FISH & RICHARDSON, supra note 79.
120. Id.
121. Press Release Federal Trade Commission, Statement of FTC Chairwoman
Edith Ramirez on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. (June 17,
2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/06/statement-ftc-chairwo
man-edith-ramirez-us-supreme-courts-decision.
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care realities of millions of Americans, and on the American economy.
Thanks to the Actavis decision, regulatory agencies are now in a
stronger position122 to challenge these settlements and work to protect
the basic principles of a free market; for although patents should be a
reward bestowed upon those who invest in innovation, they should not
be an impenetrable shield against valid claims of anticompetitive
activity.
122. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC: Recent Supreme Court Deci-
sion Puts Agency in Stronger Position to Protect Consumers From Anticompetitive Pay-
for-Delay Drug Settlements (July 23, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/07/ftc-recent-supreme-court-decision-puts-agency-stronger-position.
